The Effectiveness of Revenue-Neutral Carbon Taxes by AHMADI Younes & YAMAZAKI Akio
 
 
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 19-36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effectiveness of Revenue-Neutral Caron Taxes 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Younes Ahmadi 
Akio Yamazaki 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
 
 
The Effectiveness of Revenue-Neutral Carbon Taxes∗
Younes Ahmadi† Akio Yamazaki‡
Version: February 2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the effectiveness of carbon taxes in the manufacturing sector by
examining British Columbia’s revenue-neutral carbon tax. We theoretically demonstrate that
the magnitude of plants’ exposure to the policy monotonically increases with its emission
intensity. Using detailed confidential plant-level data, we directly exploit the variations in
plants’ emission intensity to isolate the emission effect of the policy. We find that the carbon
tax lowers emission by 2 percent. Furthermore, we find that the policy had a positive output
effect, suggesting that the carbon tax encouraged plants to produce more with less energies.
These findings are possibly due to the revenue neutrality of the policy, especially through the
reduction of the corporate income taxes. It incentivized plants to invest in both energy-saving
and productivity-enhancing technologies.
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1. Introduction
At the 21st Conference of Parties (COP211) in Paris (December 2015), countries, by consensus,
adopted the first universal climate agreement to tackle global warming. Several countries had
already implemented carbon policies to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. After the
Paris agreement, there is a general expectation in the international community that these carbon
policies would be extended. Theoretical models show that a uniform carbon tax is an effective
tool to achieve the emission reduction targets at the lowest economic costs.2 However, political
feasibility of the policy is still heavily debated around the world among policymakers and the
public. This is partly because empirical evidence on the effectiveness of carbon taxes is limited
due to the lack of high quality micro-level data. Thus this paper takes advantage of a unique plant-
level dataset to investigate the effect of the carbon tax, implemented by British Columbia (BC) in
2008, on GHG emissions from manufacturing plants.
The carbon tax in BC was unexpectedly announced in February 2008, and has been in effect
since July 2008. The tax rate initially began at $10 per tonne of CO2 equivalent (CO2eq), and
increased by $5 annually, reaching $30 in 2012. The BC carbon tax applies to all fossil fuels pur-
chased within BC, and covers 77% of total provincial emissions (Harrison, 2012). There are three
reasons why this policy is ideal to estimate the causal effect of a carbon tax on GHG emissions.
First, the BC carbon tax is comprehensive and includes all plants and all fossil fuels purchased
within BC.3 Second, the BC carbon tax rate is high when compared to other existing carbon poli-
cies,4 so companies are more likely to change their behavior in response to the policy. Third, the
fact that the tax was introduced shortly after its unexpected announcement eliminates any antici-
patory effects (i.e., prior to the implementation of the policy) as plants presumably did not have
enough time to adjust their behavior.
Our empirical strategy is motivated by a simple model of multi-region and multi-sector trade
model with a carbon tax introduced in one region. We assume perfect competition and abstract
1COP is the formal annual meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Parties. In these meetings, the member countries assess countries’ progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
negotiate over climate change agreements.
2A uniform carbon tax is a per-unit charge on fossil fuels based on their carbon embodiment, applied to all con-
sumers at the same rate. The effect of a carbon tax on GHG emissions is less pronounced when the carbon tax is
revenue neutral (i.e., all the tax revenues from the policy is returned to consumers to maintain the government rev-
enues constant). Theoretical models show that the effect depends on how the tax revenue is recycled.
3The Alberta government introduced a new climate policy in 2018 that is comprehensive. The carbon tax is
increased to $30 per tonne for larger emitters and is increased to $20 per tonne for other emitters in 2017. The carbon
tax increased to $30 for all emitters in 2018.
4Que´bec was the first province to introduce a carbon tax, but the tax rate is only around 3$ per tonne of CO2
equivalent and does not include all emitters. Some Scandinavian countries have carbon taxes as high as $150. However,
the effective tax rates are smaller due to a lot of tax exemptions and in some cases the energy excise taxes were removed
and replaced by carbon taxes.
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from trade in intermediate goods. The model decomposes the emission responses to a carbon tax
into scale effect and technique effect.5 We show that the magnitude of emission responses increases
monotonically with plants’ emission intensity, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that high
emission-intensive plants are more affected by the carbon tax relative to low emission-intensive
plants.
Using the theoretical insights, we design a triple difference estimator using plant-level emission
intensity as a continuous treatment. We directly compare plants based on the intensity of their
exposure to the carbon tax. As the magnitude of plants’ exposure to the carbon tax monotonically
increase with their emission-intensity. We contend that plants with high emission intensity are
more likely to respond to the policy by adjusting their operation or production technologies than
the low emission-intensive plants. Our triple difference estimator compares changes in emission
for plants in BC with changes in emission for plants in the rest of Canada before and after the
unilateral implementation of the carbon tax.6 Furthermore, we exploit the panel structure of data
by including various fixed effects to control for possible unobserved confounding factors, such as
commodity price shocks, provincial geographic characteristics, and industry factor intensities.
We estimate the emission effect of the policy using the confidential plant-level manufacturing
dataset, the Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM). This dataset consists of detailed information
on plant-level manufacturing activities, such as fuel expenditures, total sales, and employment.
What is unique about this dataset is that having access to plant-level fuel expenditures allows us to
construct the first-ever plant-level GHG emission dataset for Canada.7
We find that the BC carbon tax lowered the GHG emissions. The point estimate shows, on
average at $20/tCO2e, a statistically significant reduction in emissions by 2 percent. Furthermore,
we show that the policy increased outputs, suggesting that the carbon tax provided enough incen-
tives for plants to take actions to produce more with less (fossil-fuel) energy. Our findings are
quite appealing, especially to policymakers, because implementing a carbon tax can both reduce
emissions and strengthen the economy. There are two factors that could contribute to increased
5Antweiler et al. (2001) refer scale effect to be the emission response by increasing the size of the production while
referring technique effect to be the emission response by changing the production technology that improves emissions
per unit of output.
6Some, such as Andersson (2019), argue that the carbon tax may have a general equilibrium effect and lead to
carbon leakages into other provinces, which is a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
To minimize this concern, we also estimate the emission effect using only provinces that have very low trade flows with
BC because we expect very limited carbon leakages into these provinces. The selected provinces are Newfoundland
and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. The baseline
estimation results are robust to this sample difference. The results can be requested upon a request.
7Alternatively, one can use the facility-level emission data available at Environment Canada known as Greenhouse
Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP). This data includes only large industrial emitters that emit more than 100 kilotonnes
per year. The reporting threshold was reduced to 50 kilotonnes in 2009 and further to 10 kilotonnes in 2018. We believe
that our data is better suited as it covers all manufacturing plants and provides more variation while the facility-level
emission data only covers the large facilities
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outputs. First, the amount of money the BC government returned to the economy was about 15%
more than what the carbon tax took from the economy in all years between 2008-2016 (i.e., the
BC carbon tax raised $1.2 billion in 2012-13 and returned $1.4 billion). This is mainly because
the BC government announced tax reduction rates based on the projected carbon revenue, and the
actual revenue was less than the projected revenue. This means that the BC economy received a
net reduction in taxes.
Second, the revenue recycling feature of the policy may have played an important role in gen-
erating the positive output effect. The revenues collected from the carbon tax was used to lower the
rates of corporate and personal income taxes. Theoretically, a reduction of corporate income tax
(CIT) rate is shown to increase investments and capital formations, resulting in lower emission in-
tensity and higher output. Emission-intensive plants in BC are more capital intensive, these plants
receive larger benefits from the CIT cut relative to the low-emission-intensive plants. Therefore,
the output of high emission-intensive plants is expected to increase and their emission intensity
is expected to decrease relative to the low emission-intensive plants. This argument is consistent
with the results found in our paper. Yamazaki (2017, 2019) has a similar argument regarding the
importance of the revenue recycling feature of the BC carbon tax and our results are consistent
with his findings8.
A number of studies examine the effect of carbon taxes on GHG emissions using simulation
methods, such as Manne et al. (1990), Goto (1995), Floros and Vlachou (2005), and Wissema and
Dellink (2007). Although they find that a uniform carbon tax would lead to a significant reduction
in GHG emissions, it is difficult to solely rely on these findings for designing of future policies.
What we need is more of evidence-based policy suggestions.
The empirical findings, thus far, from ex-post analyses are very much mixed and limited. For
instance, Bohlin (1998) and Andersson (2019) both investigate the effect of a carbon tax in Sweden,
which was implemented in 1991. Bohlin finds that the transportation sector was not affected and
emissions from industrial sectors increased due to exemptions that decreased the effectiveness of
the energy tax. He does, however, find that GHG emissions declined in the heating sector as a result
of substitution from coal to biofuel. On the other hand, Andersson uses a synthetic control method
with the country-level data and finds that emissions from the transportation declined by 11 percent.
Lin and Li (2011) use a difference-in-differences (DID) method to estimate the effect of carbon
taxes in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. They find that there was no significant effect
in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and that the carbon tax in Norway led to a substantial
increase in GHG emissions from the oil and gas sector due to tax exemptions.
This paper is closely related to Pretis (2019). Relying on the DID method with industry-level
8Yamazaki (2017) also argues that there is a positive demand effect from lowering the personal income tax, which
could also help explaining the positive output effect found in this paper.
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emission data, Pretis finds that the BC carbon tax did not have a (statistically) significant effect
on emissions, arguing that the carbon tax rate was too low for the policy to have any impacts.
Our paper explains the weakness of the use of the DID method with the aggregate-level data in
estimating the emission effect of this particularly policy. With other major macro economic shocks
(e.g., the financial crisis) and concurrent policies implemented in other provinces, it is difficult to
isolate the casual impact of this policy using DID method. We provide empirical results suggesting
that DID method cannot isolate the effect of the BC carbon tax. To address the empirical issues
of the previous studies, we offer a comprehensive evidence on the effectiveness of carbon taxes by
directly exploiting the plant-level variations in the exposure to the policy (i.e., plant-level emission
intensity) and design a triple difference estimation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
BC carbon tax and its features. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. The description of
the data and empirical methodology are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation
results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Overview of the BC carbon tax
The BC’s Liberal government announced the new climate policy agenda in its throne speech
in February 2007. The target of the policy was to reduce BC’s GHG emissions by 33 percent (i.e.,
10 percent below the 1990 level) by 2020. Additionally, all electricity generators were required
to have zero emissions by 2016. Two months after the throne speech, the BC government an-
nounced its intention to join five U.S. states in developing a regional cap and trade system called
the Western Climate Initiative. This announcement was completely unexpected because the Lib-
eral government had been previously criticized by environmentalists for supporting off-shore oil
and gas explorations, a large decline in its environmental budget, and proposals for two new coal-
fired electricity power plants (Harrison, 2012). Those in the business community with close ties
to the Liberal government were taken by surprise. Jock Finlayson, the executive Vice President of
the BC Business Council, said:
The throne speech was a huge surprise, not just to my organization but to everybody
in the corporate community. There really was not any advance notice, either through
public statements or even through back channels. I actually dropped my coffee cup,
full of coffee, when I was watching the live broadcast. (Harrison, 2012).
The carbon tax rate initially began at $10 per tonne of CO2 equivalent (tCO2eq), and increased
by $5 annually, reaching $30 in 2012. The tax at $10/tCO2eq represented an increase of 2.4 cents
per liter for gasoline, and a $20.8 increase per ton for coal. These numbers rose to 7.2 cents per
4
liter for gasoline (equivalent to 4.4% of the final price) and $62.4 per ton of coal (equivalent to
55% of the final price) at the tax rate of $30/tCO2eq. All fossil fuels purchased within BC are
covered by the tax, and it covers 77% of total provincial emissions (Murray and Rivers, 2015).9
The BC carbon tax is comprehensive and includes all plants in BC.10
The tax was designed to be revenue neutral. The revenue is returned to consumers and busi-
nesses through: a direct transfer to low-income individuals (a one time $100 Climate Action Divi-
dend per adult in the initial year), a decline in income taxes (around 2% reduction in 2008 and 5%
reduction in 2009 for those who have annual income of less than $70,000), a decline in general
corporate income taxes (from 12 to 10 percent), and a reduction in small corporate income taxes
(from 4.5 to 2.5 percent in the first three years after the implementation of the policy). According
to the budget and fiscal plan for 2013, the carbon tax raised about $1.2 billion in revenues for 2012-
2013 and returned about $1.4 billion to consumers. The excess amount returned is around 15%
of the carbon tax’s total revenue, but is less than 1% of BC’s total budget (Ministary of Finance,
2013).
3. Theoretical Framework
We adopt a simple version of the model developed by Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) to iden-
tify channels through which a carbon tax may affect emissions. We then use this model to motivate
our identification strategy. We changed their model in three ways. First, we abstract from the trade
in intermediate goods and focus only on trade in the final goods. Second, the market structure of
manufacturing good is perfect competition rather than monopolistic competition. Third, we as-
sume a fix number of firms rather than an endogenous number of firms.11 These assumptions are
made for simplicity. Consider K provinces, indexed by i , j = 1, ..., K , which differ only with
respect to their carbon pricing policies. Only one province introduces a carbon tax while there is
no carbon tax in other provinces. Each province consumes a homogeneous good Hi and a manu-
facturing good Mi . α denotes the expenditure share of manufacturing good. Mi is a Cobb-Douglas
composite of manufacturing varieties from s sectors, indexed s = 1, ..., S. µs denotes the expen-
diture share of sector s. Consumers have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences over
9The uncovered emissions are associated with emissions produced by landfill facilities, non-combustion emissions
from agriculture sector, most of fugitive emissions, and industrial emissions that do not come from burning fossil fuels.
10There is no manufacturing industry that is exempted from the carbon tax. The agriculture sector was exempted
from the tax after 2012, which is not included in our analysis because the focus of this paper is on manufacturing
plants.
11We also assume that firms and plants are interchangeable in this section.
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quantities of varieties that are imported or produced domestically.
Ui = H1−αi Mαi , Mi =
S∏
s=1
(Msi )
µs , Msi =
( K∑
j=1
N j (qi j )
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and N j is the number of varieties produced in each
province. Solving the utility maximization problem gives the price of each variety and the de-
mand for that variety in each province.
qsi j =
N jαµs I
P1−σi
(psi j )
−σ (τ )−σ , Psi =
( K∑
j=1
N j (psi j )
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
, psi j = τi j psj (3.2)
where qi j and pi j are the province i’s consumer demand for varieties of goods produced in province
j and its price, respectively. Psi is the sectoral price index in province i , p
s
j is the price of a variety
produced in province j , τi j is the iceberg trade cost for a variety produced in province j and
consumed in province i , and αµs I is the share of income spent on each manufacturing sector.
The homogeneous good is produced under perfect competition using only labor with a marginal
productivity of one. We assume the production is diversified in all provinces, which means wage
rates are equal to one. The manufacturing goods in each sector are produced under perfect compe-
tition and constant return to scale. For simplicity, we assume a fixed number of firms in each sector,
and each sector produces a distinct variety using labor and fossil fuels. The unit cost function is
Cobb-Douglas, which depends on the wage rate and fuel prices.
csi = tβ
s
i w
1−βs
i = tβ
s
i (3.3)
where the second equality is the result of wi = 1. ti are fuel prices in each province. Fuel prices
are assumed to differ across provinces only due to a carbon tax. βs denotes the factor cost shares
of fossil fuels in each sector. The profit of each firm is (psi − tβ
s
i )q
s
i . Under a competitive market,
price equals marginal cost:
psi = tβ
s
i
Substituting the equilibrium price into the goods market clearing condition results in provinces’
sectoral production level.
qsi = αµs I (ti )−β
sσ
K∑
j=1
N j
P1−σj
(τi j )
−σ (3.4)
The total income and the sectoral price are exogenous to firms. Inserting the equilibrium price
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in Eq.(3.2) for qi j yields an expression for the quantity of province i’s total sectoral imports, Qi j ,
from province j :
Qsi j =
N jαµs I
P1−σi
(t j )−βσ (τi j )−σ (3.5)
In this simple model, I abstract from any trades of intermediate goods and only focus on the
trades in final goods. The results are, however, similar to the inclusion of the trades of intermediate
goods.12
In the next step, we show how emission levels, emission-intensity, and output levels change
due to the introduction of a carbon tax in one province. From Shephard’s lemma, the emission-
intensity of a sector is given by the derivative of the unit cost function with respect to the price of
emissions, which is the carbon tax.
ηsi =
dcsi
dti
= βsi (ti )β
s
i −1 (3.6)
Following Antweiler et al. (2001) the sectoral emissions can be decomposed into technique and
scale effects. The technique effect represents changes in sectoral emissions because of changes
in the emission-intensity of each industry or firm. Industries or firms can substitute away from
energies with high emissions content to the ones with low emissions content (e.g., switch from
coal to natural gas). The scale effect reflects the change in emissions due to a change in the volume
of sectoral output. Sectoral emissions can be written as the multiplication of sectoral emission
intensity and sectoral output.
E si j = ηsj × Qsi j i, j  {1, ..., K } (3.7)
where Qsi j and E
s
i j are the quantity and embodied emissions of imports of province i from province
j , respectively. Totally differentiating Eq.(3.7) yields:
dE si j = Qsi j
dηsj
dti
dti︸ ︷︷ ︸
Technique Effects
+ η j
dQsi j
dti
dti︸ ︷︷ ︸
Scale Effects
(3.8)
Suppose that only province i (i.e., BC) introduces a carbon tax (i.e., dt j = 0 and dti > 0).
Based on Eq.(3.4), the domestic production in each province is directly related to the carbon tax in
that province, and through the sectoral price index, indirectly depends on the carbon tax in other
12An interested reader can refer to Online Appendix of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) to view the model with the
inclusion of the trades of intermediate goods and monopolistic competition market structure.
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provinces. It can be shown that:
dqi
dti
= f (γi , ti ) S 0 (3.9)
dq j
dti
= f (τi j , γi , ti ) > 0 (3.10)
where γi is the change in corporate income tax in province i . Corporate income taxes(CIT) de-
clined by 2 percentage points after the introduction of the BC carbon tax. The reduction in the
CIT leads to higher capital investment and higher output. The carbon tax, however, reduces the
output of firms. These two opposing effects lead to an ambiguous impact of the BC carbon tax on
the output of firms. The negative output effect is larger for high emission-intensive plants than low
emission-intensive plants, but the magnitude of increased output due to the CIT cut is also larger
for high emission-intensive plants since these plants are more capital-intensive. The output level
in other provinces increases in response to the carbon tax in BC. The magnitude of this change is
a decreasing function of bilateral trade costs, an increasing function of the BC carbon tax rate, and
a decreasing function of the reduction in the BC CIT rate. Thus, we expect to see a small or no
change on the output level of provinces that have very limited trade with BC. Similar equations
can be derived for the volume of imports and exports in each province.
Using Eq.(3.6), we can find the change in the emission-intensity with respect to the carbon tax.
Each firm’s emission intensity only depends on its own province’s carbon tax.
dη j
dti
= 0 dη
s
i
dti
= (βsi − 1)
ηi
ti
< 0 (3.11)
Firm’s emission-intensity declines as the carbon tax rate increases since ηi and ti are positive and
βsi is less than one. The magnitude of this response (in the absolute value) is larger for high
emission-intensive firms when compared to low emission-intensive firms, which can be shown
by taking a second derivative of Eq.(3.11) with respect to the emission intensity.13 Eq.(3.9), and
(3.10) determine all the required parameters in the Eq.(3.8) for finding the total change in sectoral
emissions. In this section we showed that high emission-intensive plants are more affected by the
BC carbon tax. Therefore, we expect to see a larger reduction in emissions from high emission-
intensive plants. In the next section, we use these theoretical findings to design our estimation
strategy.
13The change in the natural log of emission due to the carbon tax is also higher for high emission-intensive firms
since the natural log of emission is a monotonic transformation of emission.
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4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Research Design
The goal of this paper is to estimate the causal effect of the BC carbon tax on GHG emissions
from manufacturing plants.14 Manufacturing plants account for about 15% of Canada’s total GHG
emissions. There are three reasons why we choose manufacturing plants for this study. First, data
on emissions from manufacturing plants is available in detail, whereas there is no high-quality
emission data available for other sectors. Second, manufacturing plants mainly use fossil fuels
with high embodied emissions such as coal and natural gas. Therefore, we expect the carbon tax
to have larger impacts on manufacturing plants, i.e., these plants are more likely to respond to the
carbon tax. In contrast, the transportation sector accounts for about 25% of total GHG emissions.
However, gasoline and diesel have low embodied emissions, i.e., the carbon tax imposes a very
small charge on consumers. Thus, the response of transportation sector to the carbon tax may
be small and not identifiable. Third, there is a large variation in the emission intensity and total
emissions of manufacturing plants. Focusing on the manufacturing plants allows us to capture this
extra source of variation across plants and design a more accurate estimation strategy (i.e., triple
difference estimation).15
The carbon tax in BC imposes extra costs on plants that use fossil fuels. The magnitude of
this extra cost depends on two factors. First, plants with a high emission intensity pay a high tax
per unit of output. Second, large plants pay a high tax in the absolute value because they emit
more. Therefore, a low emission-intensive plant, but with a large level of output, may pay a higher
tax in the absolute term relative to a high emission-intensive plant with a small level of output.
However, based on summary statistics, high emission-intensive plants are, on average, much larger
in terms of their output.16 This supports the approach followed in this paper, which considers low
emission-intensive plants as less-affected group. If the emission intensity is low enough, the tax
burden of the carbon tax is negligible relative to other types of costs. This allows us to treat low
emission-intensive plants as the control group in the analysis.17 We also consider plants outside
BC as untreated because they are not subject to the carbon tax. Based on these notions, we exploit
three sources of variation to estimate the causal effect of the BC carbon tax on GHG emissions
from manufacturing plants.
14The list of manufacturing industries that is provided in Appendix B at the 3-digit NAICS industry code.
15Although the oil and gas sector accounts for 25 percent of total emissions, all active plants have high emission
intensity. Therefore, there is less variation across plants that can be captured to identify the effect of interest.
16Low emission-intensive plants, on average, pay $3,000 carbon tax per year, while high emission-intensive plants,
on average, pay $100,000 carbon tax per year.
17For an average plant below the 70th percentile in emission intensity, the carbon tax imposes a charge less than
0.05 percent of the plant’s total costs.
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Table 1: The Tax Burden of the BC Carbon Tax for Various Industries
Industry
Emission Intensity
Tons/$1000
Tax paid as 
Percentage of output
5 Most Emission Intensive
Pulp and paper 1.588 3.18
Cement and concrete 1.179 2.36
Non‐metallic mineral 0.605 1.21
Primary metal manufacturing 0.447 0.89
Petroleum and coal product 0.351 0.70
5 Least Emission Intensive 0.00
Aerospace product 0.013 0.03
Tobacco manufacturing 0.011 0.02
Electronic product 0.010 0.02
Other transportation equipment 0.006 0.01
Computer and peripheral equipment 0.005 0.01
Average in Manufacturing 0.15 0.30
Median in Manufacturing 0.04 0.08
Note: This shows the top and bottom five industries in terms of their emission intensities, as well as the average and median emission intensity
among all industries. We multiply the average tax rate during the 2008-2012 period (i.e., $20/tCO2e) by industries’ emission intensity in 2007 to
calculate the average cost imposed on industries.
Source: CANSIM Table, Statistics Canada
The first source of variation is time. The BC carbon tax was unexpectedly announced in Febru-
ary 2008 and was implemented shortly after (five months after its announcement) in July 2008.
The unexpected announcement eliminates the possibility of anticipatory responses before the im-
plementation of the carbon tax.18
The second source of variation originates from the difference in emission intensity across
plants. Table 1 shows the top and bottom five industries in terms of their emission intensities,
as well as the average and median emission intensity among all industries. We multiply the av-
erage tax rate during the 2008-2012 period (i.e., $20/tCO2e) by industries’ emission intensity in
2007 to calculate the average cost imposed on industries. There is a substantial variation in the
emission intensity, and for 50 percent of industries, the carbon tax burden is less than 0.1 percent
18We do examine the anticipatory response effect of the policy using flexible estimation method, presented in
Section 5.2.
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of their output value. Even though all plants have the same incentive to reduce emissions at the
margin, the low tax burden per unit of output for small emitters creates little incentive to invest in
reducing emissions. However, low emission-intensive plants may still have the incentive to reduce
their emissions if they pay a considerable amount of tax (i.e., if plants’ output level is high enough).
Especially if fuel switching requires only a fixed cost (e.g., a fixed cost to buy new machinery that
works with electricity rather than coal and natural gas), then plants’ incentives to invest depends
only on the absolute value rather than the per unit cost of the carbon tax. Summary statistics, how-
ever, show that low emission-intensive plants pay much less carbon tax in the absolute term relative
to high emission-intensive plants. This fact suggests that even in the case of a fixed cost for fuel
switching, high emission-intensive plants have a much larger incentive to reduce their emissions.
The third source of variation is across provinces. Plants outside BC are not subject to the
carbon tax and can be used as control plants. The results from the theoretical model, however,
show that the carbon tax in BC can alter the output level in other provinces. The magnitude of
this change depends on the bilateral trade cost. The control group being (indirectly) affected by
the policy violates the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). To test the severity of this
concern, we performed a robustness test by using only provinces that have very low trade flows
with BC.19
These three sources of variations allow us to compare plants in three dimensions by employing
a triple difference estimation method. To illustrate the importance of the triple difference esti-
mation, we briefly point out the inability to isolate the effect of the BC carbon tax from other
concurrent shocks (e.g., 2008 global recession) when we do not use the triple difference estimation
here.20
The simplest way to observe the policy response of plants is to compare the emission level of
each plant in BC before and after the policy implementation. This comparison would control for
any unobserved time-invariant factors that affect plants’ emissions. Some examples of these time-
invariant characteristics are location and market access, fuel abundance in a city or province, and
proximity to coal mines. This does not, however, warrant identification of the effect of interest. A
before-after comparison would estimate the causal effect of the carbon tax if there were no other
concurrent policy or economic shocks, and in the absence of secular trends in emissions. However,
the economic recession started in 2008, about the same time as the implementation of the carbon
tax, which negatively affected the output and emissions of all plants in BC. Therefore, a before-
after comparison of plants in BC would not be able to distinguish the effect of the carbon tax from
the effect of the recession.
19The baseline estimation results presented in the later section are robust to this sample difference. The results of
this robustness check is not presented; however, they are available upon a request.
20We discuss this in more detail in Appendix A.
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To identify the emission effect of the policy while controlling for the time-variant factors, one
can take one step further and design a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation to isolate the
effect of the carbon tax. The DID estimation can capture some of the time-variant factors that were
problematic in the before-after comparison; however, we argue that it is not enough.
One way to implement a DID estimation is to compare the changes in emission before and after
the policy among high and low emission-intensive plants within BC, dropping all observations
outside BC. This DID estimation can control for the time-variant factors that are common among
plants in BC. However, if such factors have differential effects across high and low emission-
intensive plants, the DID estimation will be biased.
Alternatively, one can design a DID estimation by comparing the changes in emission before
and after the policy only among high emission-intensive plants across provinces, dropping all of the
low emission-intensive plants from the analysis. This DID estimation can capture the differential
effect among high and low emission-intensive plants, but cannot capture the differential effect
across provinces. For example, if the economic recession had different impacts across provinces,
it would bias the estimation.
To address these identification issues above, one can employ a triple difference method, which
we use in this paper. This compares the differential change in emissions for plants with high
and low emission intensity in BC before and after implementation of the carbon tax, to the same
differential change in the counterfactual plants in provinces outside of BC. This can address the
identification issues mentioned above and allows us to isolate the effect of the BC carbon tax from
the effect of the recession, or of other confounding factors that vary either at the sector or at the
province level.
4.2. Data
To identify the causal effect of the BC carbon tax on GHG emissions, we build plant-level
indices for emission intensity and trade flows across provinces. To do so, we use the Annual
Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) dataset, a uniquely accessed plant-level data set which includes:
plant-level fuel purchases, shipment destinations, sales, final products, plant location, and plant
total production costs. While limited to the manufacturing plants, the ASM dataset allows us
to calculate plant-level emissions and emission intensity that cannot be done with other known
available datasets. To construct our measure of GHG emissions, we collect fuel prices21 for various
cities in all provinces over time and then divide fuel purchases by fuel prices to determine the fuel
quantities that are used in each plant. Finally, using the embodied GHG emission of each fuel
21Fuel prices for gasoline, diesel, propane, light fuel oil, and heavy fuel oil is retrieved from Natural Resource
Canada (2016), prices for natural gas is retrieved from Statistics Canada (2015), and prices for coal is retrieved from
Natural Resource Canada (2012).
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Figure 1: Steps for calculating emission intensity
type,22 we calculate GHG emissions at the plant-level and divide by the plant’s output value to find
the emission intensity. This is the first-ever comprehensive plant-level dataset for GHG emissions
in Canada.23 These steps are shown in a simple flowchart in Figure 1.
Quick (2014) shows that estimating emissions by fuel consumption is a more accurate way to
determine GHG emissions when compared to using observed emissions from emissions monitor-
ing systems. Linn et al. (2015) show that these two alternative measures of emissions are very
consistent with each other and the results are not statistically different. In sum, previous research
suggests that the lack of emissions data in the ASM dataset is not of concern with regards to our
analysis and our method of estimating GHG emissions should be more accurate than using self-
reported emissions or at least consistent with it.
Based on summary statistics, 68 percent of all manufacturing plants report their energy expen-
diture by fuel types.24 Because not all plants report their energy expenditure, we exclude some
plants from the analysis. There are three reasons why some plants do not report their energy ex-
penditures: 1) plants were not active in the relevant years; 2) plants did not fill the fuel expenditure
section of the survey; 3) those plants are administrative plants and not manufacturing plants, and
so they do not use any fuels. There is no correlation between the size of plants and missing data
for energy expenditure. Therefore, if plants that did not report their energy expenditure were not
active for a reason other than carbon tax, or are not systematically different from other plants, there
22The embodied GHG emissions by fuel type are available at Environment Canada website.
23GHG emissions at the plant-level in Canada only exists for large emitters that emit more than 50,000 tons of
CO2 equivalent. The constructed GHG emissions from large plants in our dataset is consistent with this existing large
facility emissions dataset.
24The fact that for each fuel we use the average price in major cities in each province, is a potential source of
concern. This average price can be different from the exact price that each plant faces, because plants may have
different contracts and strategies for buying their fuel. This difference creates a certain degree of error in measuring
plant-level GHG emissions. However, if the measurement error does not vary systematically with the treatment (i.e.
is not systematically larger or smaller for plants that are more exposed to the policy and only after the BC tax is
introduced), it will only increase the noise in the data, inflating the standard errors, but it would not undermine our
ability to identify the effect of interest.
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will be no selection problem that undermines the identification strategy. The sample is restricted
to include plants that appear in the dataset at least once before and once after implementation of
the BC carbon tax.
Another concern is that the ASM dataset does not include electricity generation plants. The
electricity generation in BC is primarily from hydro, which has negligible emissions and would not
be of concern in our analysis. Furthermore, plants are taxes only for their direct purchases of fossil
fuels; therefore, we focus only on direct GHG emissions from manufacturing plants and abstract
from indirect emissions from electricity consumption.
4.3. Empirical Specification
We estimate the following equation:
ln Eli pt = β(E Il × Dt × K p)+ αl + λl ′t + φi t + δpt + li pt (4.1)
where ln Eli pt is the log of GHG emissions from plant l of industry i in province p at year t . E Il is
the average emission intensity for plant l from the pre-policy period because the emission intensity
after 2008 would be an outcome variable and would change due to the carbon tax. Dt is a dummy
for the post-policy period, which is equal to one after 2008 and is equal to zero otherwise. K p
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for BC and zero for all other provinces. αl is
the plant fixed effect that captures plant specific time-invariant characteristics, as well as industry
and province time-invariant characteristics that affect GHG emissions. λl ′t is the high emission-
intensive plant by time fixed effect. We denote l ′ as a group of plants whose E Il is greater than a
threshold. We use the 70th percentile of emission intensity in the whole sample as the threshold.
This fixed effect captures any high emission-intensive plant-specific time shocks. φi t are industry
by year fixed effects that capture any industry-specific time shocks. δpt are province by year fixed
effects that capture any province-specific and nationwide time shocks. i pt is the idiosyncratic
error term.
β is the coefficient of interest. It shows the average effect of the BC carbon tax on GHG emis-
sions from treated plants during the 2008-2012 period. The identifying assumption is that there are
no high emission-intensive-by-province specific shock to GHG emissions that are contemporane-
ous to the adoption of the BC carbon tax. In other words, there should not be any other factor aside
from the BC carbon tax that changes the GHG emissions of (more) treated plants differently than
those of untreated (or less treated) plants. This assumption fails if, for instance, there is an eco-
nomic shock that affects high emission-intensive versus low emission-intensive plants, differently
across provinces. We exclude Alberta and Que´bec as control provinces because they implemented
similar policies in 2007.
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There was a significant change in the price of natural gas in BC in 2009 and 2014. This study
focuses on the period from 2004 to 2012 period; so the price change in 2014 is out of scope and not
a concern. The price change in 2009 may be a concern. In the triple difference design we control
for industry specific shocks at the 2-digit NAICS code. Therefore, if the impact of the change in
natural gas price is not different between the high-emission-intensive and low-emission-intensive
plants, our estimation method isolates the impact of the policy from the effect of change in the
natural gas price.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline Estimates for BC plants
As mentioned earlier in the empirical research design, two different forms of DID can be used
to identify the causal effect of interest. One is to compare high and low emission-intensive plants
within BC and the other one is to compare high emission-intensive plants in BC and outside BC
before and after the policy. We found some empirical evidence suggesting that these two DID
approaches are not able to isolate the effect of the BC carbon policy from the 2008 economic
recessions and other concurrent sectoral and provincial shocks. First, we compare high and low
emission-intensive plants using only plants within BC and performed placebo estimations in other
provinces (See Table B.1 in Appendix B). This specification would reflect the effect of interest
in the absence of a secular trend in emissions at the sector level. The coefficient shows that the
BC carbon tax reduced the GHG emissions of high-emission-intensive plants in BC by 22 percent
relative to the low-emission-intensive plants. In this specification, we do not, however, allow for
sector-specific time shocks.
In Appendix A, we mathematically show that this DID estimation within BC cannot isolate
the effect of the carbon tax if the recession had a different effect across sectors. Further, we
find empirical evidence that the recession had different impacts across sectors. We run placebo
regressions in other provinces, where we introduce a carbon tax at the same time period as the
BC carbon tax (i.e., the year 2008). For example, we introduce a placebo carbon tax in Ontario in
2008 and run a DID regression comparing high and low emission-intensive plants in Ontario. We
do similar placebo regressions in Que´bec and Alberta. If the DID estimation within BC is able to
isolate the effect of the carbon tax, then we expect to see no significant effect in all other provinces
using the similar method. The results, however, show that the estimated coefficient from the DID
estimation within each province is strongly negative and statistically significant. This suggests
that there was a shock common to most provinces in 2008 that affected high emission-intensive
plants more severely than low emission-intensive ones. This common shock can be attributed to
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the economic recession, which started in 2008.
Second, we compare high emission-intensive plants in BC with those in the rest of Canada.
In this specification, we do not need to worry about differential time trends across high and low
emission-intensive plants, but we cannot control for province-specific time shocks. The coefficient
shows that GHG emissions from manufacturing plants in BC declined by 8 percent due to the
carbon tax. This specification would reflect the causal effect of interest in the absence of any con-
current shock or policy change at the province level. There are several reasons that these assump-
tions may not be true. For instance, some provinces like Alberta and Que´bec implemented similar
policies in 2007. Moreover, the economic recession could affect provinces differently because
provinces have different industry compositions, have access to different international markets, and
because some provinces are natural resource-based economies (i.e. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba encounter less impact from the recession).
We also show, in Appendix A, that this comparison cannot isolate the effect of the carbon
tax if the recession had a different impact across provinces. We also find empirical evidence
suggesting differential effects of the recession across provinces. We run placebo regressions in
other provinces, where we introduce a placebo tax in Ontario, Que´bec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta. If the DID estimation across provinces (i.e., comparing only high emission-intensive
plants across provinces) was able to isolate the effect of the BC carbon tax, then we expect no
significant effect in other provinces using the same method. The coefficient of interest is negative
for Ontario and positive for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. These results suggest that
this comparison also cannot isolate the effect of the BC carbon tax. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba, which are resource-based economies, withstood the impacts of the economic recession
better. This fact is consistent with the positive coefficient for these provinces. The results of these
placebo tests are presented in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
We then use a triple difference method to deal with the identification issue regarding DID
estimations. This specification allows for province, industry, and high emission-intensive plant
specific time effects. These fixed-effects can capture any differential effect of the economic reces-
sion across provinces, industries, and sectors. The results of four specifications based on Eq.(4.1)
are reported in Table 2. First two columns report coefficients estimated using the data at the plant-
level whereas last two columns report coefficients estimated using the semi-aggregated data. We
aggregate the data to the city-by-sector (6-digit NAICS) level to address a measurement error in
the dependent variable. As we are using the constructed emission data based on fuel expenditures
from a survey-based dataset, there is a concern of measurement error in the dependent variable
(i.e., plants GHG emissions), as well as in the independent variable (i.e., emission-intensity of
plants).25
25Measurement error in the dependent variable is less of concern because it only reduces precision in estimating the
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Table 2: Baseline Estimates for Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E Il × Dt × K p -0.20 -0.15 -0.26** -0.23**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
Plant Y Y
City × sector Y Y
Industry × time Y Y
Measurement error correction Y Y
N 117445 117445 41548 41548
R2 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.93
Notes: Dependent variable is log of plant-level emission. E Il is the average emission inten-
sity for plant l from the pre-policy period. Dt is a dummy for the post-policy period, which
is equal to one after 2008 and is equal to zero otherwise. K p is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one for BC and zero for all other provinces. Sector refers to the 6-digit NAICS
industry while industry refers to the 2-digit NAICS industry. All specifications include high
emission intensive plant by time FE, and province by time FE. To account for serial cor-
relations and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province by
industry (at 2-digit NAICS), reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
To deal with the measurement error, we follow a similar approach as Chowdhury and Nickell
(1985). They show that dividing the sample into different groups and taking the average within
each group would reduce the measurement error to a large extent. We take the average of plants’
emission intensity during the 2005-2007 period, as well as taking the average of plants’ emission
intensity within the same industry and city.26 We expect that taking the average in two dimen-
sions reduces the measurement error to a large extent. This approach also allows us to reduce
the measurement error in the dependent variable, which improves the precision of estimating the
standard errors. The downside of this approach is that we cannot control for confounding factors
at the plant-level. We are, however, still able to control for such factors common to industries and
locations.
In all columns, we control for high emission-intensive plant by time fixed-effects27, and province
standard error, but the coefficient would be unbiased. The measurement error in emission intensity is more of concern
because it causes attenuation bias, as it biases the estimates downward. For more details regarding measurement errors
in panel data refer to Griliches and Hausman (1986). I use plants’ emission intensity prior to 2008 meaning that the
measurement error would not be correlated with the treatment variable.
26We take the average over time and across plants within the same 6-digit North America Industry Classification
System (NAICS) code and the same city. Each industry-by-city group contains about 3 plants.
27Plants with emission intensity higher than 70 percentile are considered high emission-intensive plants. Results
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by time fixed-effects. Plant fixed-effects are included in the first two columns while city by sector
(6-digit NAICS) fixed-effects are included in the last two columns. Industry (at 2-digit NAICS)
by time fixed-effects are included in column 2 and 4. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
province by industry (2-digit NAICS).28 The sample covers from 2004 to 2012 and includes only
plants that appear in the data set at least once before and once after implementation of the carbon
tax.
All specifications show negative signs with the similar magnitudes, implying that the carbon tax
had a negative impact on the manufacturing emission in BC. As expected, addressing the measure
error by the data-aggregation improved the precision of the estimations so that the coefficients
from column 3 and 4 are negative and statistically significant. Although adding the industry by
time FEs reduced the size of the coefficient slightly, the point estimates are robust to the inclusion
of such FEs. These point estimates suggest that at the average tax rates (at $20/tCO2e), the carbon
tax reduced the manufacturing emission by approximately 2 percent.29
5.2. Robustness Check
5.2.1. Anticipatory Effect
Plants might have anticipated the BC carbon tax and changed their behavior prior to the im-
plementation of the policy. The BC carbon tax was announced unexpectedly, but plants might still
get informed prior to the announcement. To test for the presence of an anticipatory response, we
use an event-study method to investigate the evolution of the emission effects during the sample
period, treating 2007 as the base year.30 The emission effect should be zero for all years during the
pre-policy period (2004-2007) in order to have no anticipatory effect. The results from this event-
study method are shown in Figure 2. The point estimates for the pre-policy period are all close
to zero (i.e., precisely estimated zero), which confirms that there was no anticipatory response
to the BC carbon tax. It is clear from the figure that the emission effects are declining after the
implementation of the policy.
are robust to using 50 and 60 percentile.
28We also cluster the standard errors at the province level as well as province by 3-digit NAICS industry level,
and results are similar. Mackinnon and Webb (2019) show that under-clustering (i.e., clustering at the 3-digit NAICS
industry by province) suffers from a severe over-rejection, implying that ignoring the within-province correlation is
worse than having too few cluster groups (i.e., clustering at the province level). Thus, we cluster at the 2-digit NAICS
industry by province.
29This 2 percent reduction is calculated by 100 ×
(
e(βˆ E I i − 1
)
where E I i the average emission intensity among
the BC plants. We also calculated the upper and lower bounds for the emission effect, which are 0.22 and 3.5 percent
reduction, respectively.
30This method is also referred to as a flexible estimation.
18
Figure 2: Regression Result from Event-study Method for Emissions
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Note: This figure plots the point estimates from the event-study method estimation, treating 2007 as the base year
(indicated by red solid line). Y-axis is the percentage change in emission while x-axis is year.
Source: Author’s calculation.
5.3. Mechanism: Scale vs. Technique effects
As we discussed in Section 3, emissions can decrease by either an improvement of technology
(technique effect), a reduction in output (scale effect), or both. This suggests that the 2 percent
reduction in emission found in the previous section could be solely due to the scale effect, which
would further imply that the emission reduction would necessarily come at the cost of manufac-
turing output. We explore this possibility by investigating the effect of the carbon tax on the
manufacturing output. The result of estimating Eq.(4.1) with the log of output being the dependent
variable is shown in Table 3.
Contrary to the prior expectation described above, Table 3 shows an interesting and appealing
result, i.e., the estimated coefficient is statistically significant and positive. This suggests an in-
crease of the manufacturing output in response to the policy. The point estimate shows that, at the
average tax rates (at $20/tCO2e), the output increases by 0.8 percent.31
If the scale effect is positive, emissions can decline only through the improvement of tech-
nology.32 There are two possible channels through which this particular policy can generate this
31This 0.8 percent increase is calculated using the same method as the emission effect, and its upper and lower
bounds are 1.1 and 0.5 percent, respectively.
32We also estimated Eq.(4.1) with the plant-level emission intensity being the dependent variable and found a
statistically significant negative result.
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Table 3: Baseline Estimate for Output Effect
(1)
E Il × Dt × K p 0.097***
(0.018)
N 41548
R2 0.96
Notes: Dependent variable is log of plant-level output. E Il is the average emission
intensity for plant l from the pre-policy period. Dt is a dummy for the post-policy
period, which is equal to one after 2008 and is equal to zero otherwise. K p is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one for BC and zero for all other provinces.
It includes high emission intensive plant by time FE, province by time FE, industry
(2-digit NAICS) by time FE, and city by sector (6-digit NAICS) FE. The measurement
error correction is also applied to this specification. To account for serial correlations
and within sub-industry correlations, standard errors are clustered by province by in-
dustry (2-digit NAICS), reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level,
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
positive technique effect. The first is that the carbon tax can directly provide an incentive for plants
to invest in an energy-saving technologies. This is because plants may wish to lower the long-run
financial costs of paying the carbon tax.
The second channel is through the reduction of the corporate income taxes (CIT). As a CIT
is essentially a tax on capital, reducing its rate would improve a distortion in plants’ decision
on capital. This could incentivize plants to invest. What is different from the first channel is
that this channel can also explain the positive output effect found in this paper because plants
may also invest in productivity-enhancing technologies. As lowering the user costs of capital
provides incentives for all types of capital, not just energy-saving related capital, these investments
may allow plants to produce more with the same amount of inputs or even less inputs. This is
why it is possible for plants to reduce emission while producing more. In fact, Yamazaki (2019)
theoretically supports this argument by showing the importance of this revenue-recycling through
a CIT reduction.
One concern here is the measure of output. The ASM does not provide the quantity of output
produced, instead it records the total sales (the product of product price and quantity). The increase
in output found in this section can also be due to the increase of price. Although there is no direct
way to test or isolate the price effect, we argue that this may not be much of concern in this
particular context because a majority of plants in the sample are heavily traded internationally.
This implies that their output prices are determined at the world market, not set by individual
plants. This is especially true for Canadian manufacturing plants as Canada is considered as a
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small open economy. Yamazaki (2019) confirms this view in the context of productivity.
Putting together the results, manufacturing plants seem to respond to a revenue-neutral car-
bon tax by investing in both energy-saving and productivity-enhancing technologies, which allows
them to lower emissions while producing more.
6. Conclusion
Several jurisdictions implemented unilateral environmental policies such as carbon taxes to
reduce their GHG emissions. After the universal climate agreement in Paris (December 2015), it
is expected that more countries impose carbon policies to limit their GHG emissions. Empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of such policies is, however, very limited. This paper takes advantage
of a unique plant-level dataset and uses the revenue-neutral carbon tax in BC as an ideal setting to
estimate the effect of this policy on GHG emissions from manufacturing plants.
We point out that conventional DID methods are not able to distinguish the causal effect of the
BC carbon tax from the effect of the economic recession. To deal with this identification issue,
we directly exploit a variation in emission intensity across plants, in additional to the over-time
and across-province variation, and design a triple difference estimation. This method allows us to
isolate the causal effect of the carbon tax on GHG emissions. We find that, at the average tax rates
($20/tCO2e), the BC carbon tax led to a decline in manufacturing emissions by approximately
2 percent. Furthermore, we investigate whether this decline in emission comes entirely by the
negative scale effect of the policy. We find that output increased by 0.8 percent in response to the
policy, suggesting that the reduction of corporate income taxes encouraged plants to invest in both
energy-saving and productivity-enhancing technologies (i.e., positive technique effects) to produce
more with less energy.
The appealing findings from this paper is mainly due to the revenue-neutrality feature of this
policy, especially the reduction of the corporate income tax. As we mentioned, the amount of tax
revenues the BC government returned to its economy was 15% more than what the BC carbon
tax collected. Although we did not directly estimate the technique effect of this policy, recycling
the carbon tax revenues to reduce the CIT played a major role in the emission reduction from the
manufacturing sector through investments. What would be important to investigate in a future
research is the long-run effect of the policy. This paper already demonstrated the importance of the
technique effect for emission reductions in response to the policy. Many argue that it takes time for
investments to have a substantial impact on emission reductions, productivity enhancement, or even
both. Thus, investigating the long-run effect of this policy would provide a fruitful contribution to
both the literature and public policy. In addition, we can understand better about the magnitude of
each component of a revenue-neutral carbon tax by separately identifying the emission and output
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effects from the carbon tax and CIT cut.
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Appendices
Appendix A Mathematical Illustration of the Weakness of the
DID Estimation
In the main text, we explain the weakness of the DID estimation. In this appendix, we explicitly
show the exact bias in the DID estimation.
With our data, there are three sources of variations that can be exploited to isolate the effect of
the carbon tax. First two obvious variations are temporal and regional variations, i.e., pre-policy
vs. post-policy period and BC vs. the rest of Canada. The third variation comes from the fact
that the exposure to the policy differ by emission intensity of plants, i.e., high emission-intensive
vs. low emission-intensive plants. We show the identification issue regarding two potential DID
estimations.
Suppose that Y0lpt is the potential emissions from plant l, in province p, and at time t in the
absence of any carbon tax. Denote Y1lpt as the potential emissions of a plant in the presence of
a carbon tax. One of the main assumptions of DID estimations is that the potential outcome in
the no-treatment state has an additive structure. This assumption means that in the absence of the
treatment, the potential outcome is determined by the sum of a time-invariant province effect and
a year effect that is common across provinces.
E[Y0lpt |p, t] = γp + λt (A.1)
While in the main analysis we directly use the plant-level variation in emission intensity,
here instead we discretize this variation by grouping plants into high emission-intensive and low
emission-intensive plants.
Formally, let Dlpt be a dummy variable for high emission-intensive plants in BC after year
2008, let Dlt be a dummy variable for high emission-intensive plants in all provinces after 2008,
and let Dpt be a dummy variable for each province after 2008. In the rest of the appendix, we
exclusively refer to the two different categories of emission intensity as “sectors”. Suppose that
the economic recession had different impacts across provinces and sectors. Assuming that the BC
carbon tax did not have any impact on low emission-intensive plants, the observed emissions, Yilpt ,
can be written as:
Yilpt = γp + λt + ρ1Dlpt + ρ2Dlt + ρ3Dpt + lpt (A.2)
where λt captures the effect of the recession common for all plants, ρ1 is the effect of the BC
carbon tax on GHG emissions, ρ2 is the effect of the recession on high emission-intensive plants
24
relative to the low emission-intensive ones, ρ3 is the differential effect of the recession on BC
relative to the rest of Canada, and E[lpt |l, p, t] = 0.
One way to implement a DID estimation is to compare high and low emission-intensive plants
within BC and drop all observations outside BC. This DID estimation can control for the differ-
ential effect of the recession across provinces, but cannot control for the differential effect of the
recession across high and low emission-intensive plants.
E[Yilpt |l = high|p = BC, t ≥ 2008]− E[Yilpt |l = high|p = BC, t < 2008]
= λt≥2008 − λt<2008 + ρ1 + ρ2
E[Yilpt |l = low|p = BC, t ≥ 2008]− E[Yilpt |l = low|p = BC, t < 2008]
= λt≥2008 − λt<2008
The DID would result in:
E[Yilpt |l = high|p = BC, t ≥ 2008]− E[Yilpt |l = high|p = BC, t < 2008]
− E[Yilpt |l = low|p = BC, t ≥ 2008]− E[Yilpt |l = low|p = BC, t < 2008]
= ρ1 + ρ2
The coefficient from this DID estimation would capture the effect of the carbon tax plus the effect
of the economic recession.
Another way to design a DID estimation is to compare high emission-intensive plants across
provinces. We drop low emission-intensive plants from the analysis. Using a similar logic, it can
be shown that the coefficient from this DID would capture ρ1 + ρ3, which is the effect of the BC
carbon tax plus the effect of the recession. DID estimations can identify the causal effect of the
BC carbon tax only if the economic recession had exactly the same impact on all provinces and
sectors (i.e., ρ2 and ρ3 are equal to zero).
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Appendix B Additional Table
Table B.1: DID and Placebo Regressions within Provinces
(BC) (ON) (QC) (AB)
E Il × Dt -0.22** -0.15** -0.16** -0.27**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
N 5351 15877 10174 4282
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93
Notes: Dependent variable is log of plant-level emission. Dt is a dummy for the post-policy
period, which is equal to one after 2008 and is equal to zero otherwise. E Il is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the emission intensity for a given plant is greater than a threshold,
and is zero otherwise. We use the 70th percentile of emission intensity in the whole sample
as the threshold. Emission intensity captures the variation of the policy impact across plants
and provinces. All specifications include plant fixed-effects and industry-by-time fixed-effects.
Standard errors clustered at industry-level (2-digit NAICS) are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the
10 percent level.
Table B.2: DID and Placebo Regressions across Provinces
(BC) (ON) (QC) (MB) (SK) (AB)
Dt × K p -0.086 -0.23*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.32** 0.28***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08)
N 11585 11585 11585 15877 11585 11585
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Notes: Dependent variable is log of plant-level emission. Dt is a dummy for the post-policy
period, which is equal to one after 2008 and is equal to zero otherwise. K p is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for BC and zero for all other provinces. Only plants that
have emission intensity greater than the 70th percentile are included. All specifications include
plant fixed-effects and industry-by-time fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at industry-
level (2-digit NAICS) are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗
Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.3: Manufacturing Industries at 3-digit NAICS code
311 Food manufacturing
312 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing
313 Textile mills
314 Textile product mills
315 Clothing manufacturing
316 Leather and allied product manufacturing
321 Wood product manufacturing
322 Paper manufacturing
323 Printing and related support activities
324 Petroleum and coal product manufacturing
325 Chemical manufacturing
326 Plastics and rubber products manufacturing
327 Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing
331 Primary metal manufacturing
332 Fabricated metal product manufacturing
333 Machinery manufacturing
334 Computer and electronic product manufacturing
335 Electrical equipment, appliance and component manufacturing
336 Transportation equipment manufacturing
337 Furniture and related product manufacturing
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing
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